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SOME LAND TITLE FACTS
(Continued From November Issue)

The Act of 16th March, 1865, P. L. 396 fixes the line
between Berks and Lebanon as follows:
"That the part of the boundary line, between the
counties of Berks and Lebanon, beginning at the corner
of the counties of Lancaster and Lebanon; thence north
forty-seven and a quarter degrees, west seventeen hundred
and fifty-four perches, to a point in the public road, leading
from Missimer's station to Stouchsburg, on the land of
Isaac Groff, be and the same is hereby changed, so as to
make and establish the following, the dividing lines, between
said counties of Berks and Lebanon, to wit: beginning at
the aforesaid corner of the counties of Lancaster and Lebanon; thence north thirty-nine degrees west thirteen hundred and fifty-one perches to a post, on, or near, the land
of Jacob Kehl; and thence north seventy two and a
quarter degrees, west four hundred and sixty one perches,
to the aforesaid point, in the public road, leading from
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Missimer's station to Stouchsburg; and that the part of
Berks county, hereby annexed to Lebanon county, shall be
deemed and considered, in all respects, and to all intents
and purposes, as part of Lebanon county."

Columbia county was formed from a part of Northumberland county by an act passed 22nd of March, 1813,
6 Sm. L. 46. The boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at the nine mile tree on the bank of the
northeast branch of the Susquehanna, and from thence by
the line of Point township, to the line of Chilisquaque township; thence by the line of Chilisquaque and Point townships, to the west branch of the river Susquehanna; thence
up the same to the line of Lycoming county; thence by
the line of Lycoming county to the line of Luzerne county;
thence by the same to the line of Schuylkill county; thence
along the same, to the southwest corner of Catawissa township; then by the line of Catawissa and Shamokin townships, to the river Susquehanna; and thence down said
river to the place of beginning."

The act of 21st of February, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 250; fixed
the line dividing Luzerne and Columbia counties as follows:
"Beginning at the southwest corner of Salem township,
and from thence to continue on the west line of said township to the northwest corner thereof; thence to the south-

west corner of Huntingdon township; thence to run on the
west line of said township, to the northwest corner of the
same, and from thence to strike by a direct line, the corner
boundary of Lycoming county, which divides it from Luzerne; which line, when run and marked, shall be the boundary line dividing the county of Luzerne from the county
of Columbia."

The act of 21st of February, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 248 annexes
Turbit and Chilisquaque townships to Northumberland
county. The act of 22nd of January, 1816, 6 Sm. L. 307
annexes a portion of these townships to Columbia county.
The part annexed is as follows,:
"Beginning at the corner of Point and Chilisquaque
townships in the line of Columbia county, thence by the
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lines of said townships along the summit of Montaur's
mountain, to where what is called Strawbridge's road crosses
said mountain, thence by said road to where the road from
Wilson's mills to Danville intersects said road, thence to
the bridge over Chilisquaque creek at James Murray's,
thence by what is called Harrison's road past Chillisquaque
meeting house to the corner of Turbit and Derry townships
in the line of Lycoming county, thence by the line of Columbia county to the place of beginning."
The Act of 7th April 1830, P. L. 341, provides for part
of the line between Columbia and Northumberland counties
as follows:
"Beginning at the mouth of Little Roaring creek, thence
up said creek to the head thereof, thence on the ridge to
the south branch of Big Roaring creek, from thence up the
said creek to Yarnall's Path, thence a southeasterly course
to the county line; Provided, that the county commissioners
of Columbia county shall first express in writing, their
assent to the provisions of this and the two succeeding
sections of this act."

The Act of 15th January 1853, P. L. 2 provides as
follows:
"Section 1. That the township of Roaring Creek, in
Montour county, and such parts of the townships of Franklin, Madison, and West Hemlock, in the same county as lie
eastward of the adjusted line between Columbia and Montour counties hereinafter prescribed and established, shall
be, and the same are hereby re-annexed to the county of

Columbia."
"Section 2. That the line between the said counties of
Columbia and Montour shall be changed and re-located as
follows, to wit: Beginning at the Northumberland county
line, at or near the house of Samuel Reader, thence in a
direct course to the centre of Roaring Creek, in Franklin
township, twenty rods above a point in said creek opposite
the house of John Vought; thence down the middle of the
stream of said creek to the Susquehanna river; thence to
the middle of said river; thence up the center of the same
to a point opposite where the present county line between
Columbia and Montour strikes the north bank of the river;
thence to the said north bank; thence by the present division

1 O0
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line between said counties to the schoolhouse near the residence of David Smith; thence to a point near the residence
of Daniel Smith; thence to the bridge over Deerlick run
on the line between Derry and Madison townships; thence
by the line of Lycoming county."

The Act of 1st May, 1861, P. L. 424, provides that commissioners shall run and adjust the boundary line between
the counties of Luzerne and Columbia along the west side
of Huntingdon township in Luzerne county, from the southwest corner of Huntingdon township; thence along westerly boundary of farms and surveys of Huntingdon township to the southwest corner of Fairmount township, in
Luzerne county.
Union county was formed from a part of Northumberland county by an act passed 22nd of March, 1813. The
boundaries were as follows:
"All that part of Northumberland county, lying on the
west side of the river Susquehanna and the west branch
of the same."
The act of 16th of March, 1819, 7 Sm. L. 170 annexes

the following part of Mifflin county to Union county:
"That all that part of Decatur township, in Mifflin
county, lying eastward of a line to begin at or near the
south east corner of* Centre county on the top of Jacks
mountain, nearly opposite to John Everhart's still house,
so that the same remains in the county of Mifflin; and from
thence a south course to the original division line, between
Union and Mifflin counties, shall form, and after the passing
of this act, be annexed to the county of Union."
The Act of 16th of March, 1820, 7 Sm. L. 270, provides
for running the line between Mifflin and Union counties

and confirms the line run by Peter Hugenberg as the
division line if the line is not run.
See Lycoming county for boundary between Union and
Lycoming counties.
Pike County was formed from a part of Wayne county
by an act passed 26th of March, 1814, 6 Sm. L. 190; the
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boundaries were as follows:
"All that part of Wayne county lying south and east
of a direct line from the lower end of Big Eddy on Delaware river, to the mouth of Wallenpaupack creek, and thence
up the same to the main forks thereof, thence up the south
branch to where the most southern branch crosses the north

and south road, from thence due west, to the line of Luzerne
county."

Perry County was formed from a part of Cumberland
county by an act passed 22nd of March, 1820, 7 Sm. L. 275.
The county was to be formed September 1st, 1820, and
the boundaries were as follows:
"That all that part of Cumberland county lying north
of the Blue mountain, beginning on the summit of the
Blue mountain, where the Franklin county line crosses the
same, and running thence along the summit thereof an
eastwardly course to the river Susquehanna, thence up the
west side of the same to the line of Mifflin county, thence
along the Mifflin county line to the summit of the Tuscarora mountain, thence along the same to the place of beginning."
Section 5 of the act of 28th of Apil, 1841, P. L. 293,
fixes the line between Perry and Franklin counties as
follows:
"Beginning at the corner of Cumberland and Franklin
counties on the top of the Blue mountain; thence by a line
in the direction of Concord, to the summit of the next
mountain; thence along the summit of said mountain as far
as practicable so as to leave the entire valley of Amberson, in the county of Franklin, and to divide the mountain
territory as equally as possible between the two counties;
thence along the summit of the round top, to the most
practicable point on the Conococheague mountain, leaving
the entire valley called Sherman's valley, in the county of
Perry and Juniata counties; and the said commissioners are
required in all cases (in running said division line) to keep
as near as possible to the summit of said mountain."
Juniata County was formed from a part of Mifflin
county by the act of 2nd of March, 1831, P. L. 99. The
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boundaries were as follows:
"That all that part of Mifflin county, lying south and
east of a line, beginning on the summit of Black Log
mountain, where the Huntingdon county line crosses the
same and running thence along the summit thereof to the
Juniata river; thence across the same to a marked Black
Oak, standing by the road, on the north side of said river,
about the middle of the Long Narrows, known as a line
tree, between Derry and Fermanaugh townships, in said
county; thence along the summit of Shade mountain, to
the line of Union county; and thence along the said line
down Mahahtango creek, to the Susquehanna river."

Monroe county was formed from parts of Northampton
and Pike counties by the act of 1st of April, 1836, P. L. 430.

The boundaries were as follows:
"That the townships of Ross, Chestnuthill, Tobyhanna,
Pocono, Hamilton, Stroud and Smithfield north of the Blue
mountain, in Northampton county, together with the townships of Middle Smithfield, Price and Colbaugh in Pike
county shall and the same are hereby declared to be erected
into a separate county, to be called Monroe."

The act takes effect as of September 1st, 1836.
Clarion county was formed from parts of Venango and
Armstrong counties by the act of 11th of March, 1839, P.
L. 51, the county be formed as of September 1st, 1840. The
boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at the junction of Redband creek with the
Allegheny river, thence up said creek to the line dividing
Jefferson and Armstrong counties, thence along said line to
the line dividing Toby and Saratoga townships in Venango

county, thence along said line, to the corner of Farmington
township, in Venango county, thence a straight line to the
place of beginning."

Clinton County was formed from parts of Lycoming
and Centre counties by the act of 21st of June, 1839, P. L.
362. The boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at Pine Creek, where the north line of
Lycoming county crosses said creek; thence a straight line
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to the house of William Herrod; thence following the Condersport and Jersey Shore turnpike, the several courses and
distances thereof, to the middle of Pine Creek; thence down
the said creek, the several courses thereof, to its junction
with the West Branch of the river Susquehanna; thence
a straight line to the northeast corner of Centre county;
thence a straight line to the northeast corner of Centre
county; thence to include Logan, Lamar and Bald Eagle
townships, in Centre county; thence along the Lycoming
county line of Clearfield, McKean, Potter and Tioga
counties, to the place of beginning."

Wyoming county was formed from a part of Luzerne
county by the act of 4th of April, 1842, P. L. 222. The
boundaries were as follows:
"That all that portion of the county of Luzerne included in the following boundaries commencing in the
township of Exeter, the county of Luzerne, at a point of
rocks upon the west bank of the Susquehanna river, near
the head of the Flat Rock Rifts, thence a west course
parallel with the south line of Susquehanna county, to the
eastern line of Lycoming county, thence by and with said
east line of Lycoming county, a northeasterly course to the
south line of Bradford county, being the northwest corner
of Luzerne county, thence east by and with the south
line of Bradford and Susquehanna counties to the northeast
corner of Benton township, in Luzerne county, thence by
and with the east line of Benton, a south course to the
line of Abington township, thence a southerly course direct
to the bridge across the creek near Hiram Bailey's, thence
a southerly course to intersect the southerly line of Fall
township four miles from the place the said line strikes
the Susquehanna river, thence direct to the place of beginning."

The act of 28th of June, 1842 P. L. 306, fixes the boundary between the counties of Wyoming and Luzerne as
follows:
"Beginning on the south line of Susquehanna county
where said line crosses the North Branch of the Tunkhannock creek, thence down said creek with it a natural
channel to the western line of Benton township, thence on
the line between the townships of Benton and Nicholson,
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to the southeast corner of Nicholson township, thence westerly the same course with the principal line between Benton
and Nicholson, to the southerly line of Abington township,
thence eastwardly with the line between the townships
of Abington and Falls two miles, and thence westerly to
the Flat Rock Rift, in the Susquehanna river, between the
townships of Falls and Exeter (as described in the act, to
which this is a supplement,) and from thence a southwesterly course to the south east corner of Monroe township, thence west on a line parallel with the south line of
Susquehanna county, to the line of Lycoming county, and
thence with the Lycoming, Bradford and Susquehanna
county line as they tow are, and as described in the act,
to which this is a supplement, to the place of beginning."
Carbon County was formed from parts of Northampoon and Monroe counties by the act of 13th of March, 1843,
P. L. 85. The boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at the northwest corner of Northampton
county, thence southwardly along the said county line till
it intersects the northern line of Lehigh county, thence
eastwardly along the top of the Blue mountain to the
southwest corner of Monroe county, thence northwardly
along the Monroe county line and continue the same point
of compass in a direct line through Tobyhanna township,
in Monroe county, to such point as may strike the Luzerne
county line, thence westwardly along the Luzerne county
line to the place of beginning."
The Act of 19th April, P. L. 462, provides:
"Section 2. That so much of the territory of the
county of Luzerne as is embraced within the lines and
description hereafter given, shall be and the same is hereby
annexed to and made part of the county of Carbon, said line
to begin at a post corner in the line established and confirmed by the preceding section, and also in a line of a
tract of land in the warrantee name of George Smithers,
junior; thence north three degrees east one hundred and
forty-eight perches, to a stone corner in line of tract of
land in the warrantee name of Jeremiah Smith; thence
north sixty-nine degrees east five hundred and thirty-two
perchis crossing the said Jeremiah Smith and another tract
in the warrantee name of Henry Smithers, to a stone corner
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by a pine; thence south eighty-seven degrees east two
hundred and twenty perches, to a stones corner in line between tracts in the warrantee name of Samuel Scott and
Alexander Hunter; thence south eighty-nine and a half
degrees east one hundred and fifty perches, to a post corner
in the said county line, the said line being one run on the
eighth and ninth days of April Anno Domini one thousand
eight hundred and fifty-six, by Henry Colt, deputy surveyor
of Luzerne county."

Elk County was formed from parts of Jefferson, Clearfield and McKean counties by the act of 18th of April,
1843, P. L. 312. The boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at the northeast corner of Jefferson county,

thence due east about nine miles to the northeast corner of
lot number two thousand three hundred and twenty-eight,
thence due south to Clearfield county, thence east along said
line to the east line of Gibson township, and thence south so
far that a westwardly line to the mouth of Mead's run shall
pass within not less than fifteen miles of the town of Clearfield, and thence westwardly to Little Toby's creek, along
said line to the mouth of Mead's run, thence in a northwesterly direction to where the west line of Ridgeway township crosses the Clarion river, thence so far in the same
direction to a point from whence a due north line will strike
the southwest corner of M'Kean county, thence along said
line to the southwest corner of M'Kean county, thence east
along the south line of M'Kean county to the place of

beginning.'

The act of 9th of March, 1870, P. L. 363 annexes the
township of Millstone in the county of Forrest to the
county of Elk.
The Act of 13th April, 1872, P. L. 861, provides that the
line run by E. P. Goff shall be the boundary line between
Elk and Forrest counties.
Blair county was formed from parts of Huntingdon

and Bedford counties by the act of 26th of February, 1846,
P. L. 6A, the county to be formed as of the fourth Monday
of July, 1846. The boundaries were as follows:
"That the territory within the townships of North
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Woodbury and Greenfield in the county of Bedford, and
the territory within the townships of Allegheny, Autis,
Snyder, Tyrone, Frankstown, Blair, Huston and Woodbury,
and within that part of Morris township lying westward of
the line lately run by William Reed and other viewers under
an order of court, for the purpose of dividing the same in
the county of Huntingdon, are hereby erected according to
said boundaries, into a new and separate county, to be called
"Blair"."

Sullivan county was formed from a part of Lycoming
county by the act of 15th of March, 1847, P. L. 462, the

county to be established as of the first Monday in January,
1848.

The boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at the thirteenth mile in the line between
Bradford and Lycoming counties; thence a southerly course
to the Loyalsock creek, near the farm formerly occupied
by John Snell, in Plunket's Creek township, thence a southeastern course to a line of the Asylum company's survey of
land near the Beaver dam, in Davidson township; thence
along said survey south about seventy-five degrees east to
Columbia county line, near the waters of Little Fishing
creek; thence by the old Luzerne county line, (Now Luzerne
and Wyoming) a northerly course to the corner of the
Bradford and Lycoming county line; and from thence to the
place of beginning."

Forrest County was formed from a part of Jefferson
county by Joint Resolution of the llth of April, 1848, P. 1,.
Sess. 1851, Page 744. The boundaries were as follows:
"That so much of Jefferson county as will be included
in the following boundaries, viz: Beginning at the termination of the straight line running west on the south side of
Elk county, and from thence a due west course until the
same intersects the north and south line on the west side
of Jefferson county, thence along the Jefferson county line
to its termination, thence east along the Jefferson County
line to the Elk county line, thence along the Elk county line
to the place of beginning, be and the same is hereby erected
into a new county, to be called "Forrest County."
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The act of 2nd April 1851, P. L. 314, provides:
"Section 3. That the north bank of the Clarion river, at
high water mark, from where the west line of Elk county
crosses the said river, is hereby declared and made the south
boundary of Forrest county."

The act of 31st of October, 1866, P. L. Sess. 1867, 1527
enlarges Forrest county by annexing the following parts
of Venango county:
"Beginning on the Venango and Warren county line,
at the southeast corner of South-West township, in the
county of Warren; thence by a line, southward, to a
point in Pine Grove township, in Venango county, opposite
the middle northwest corner of Washington township,
Clarion county; thence in a straight line, east, to said
corner; thence east along the Clarion county line, to a
point where said line diverges in a northerly course; thence
north along said line, to the upper northwest corner of
the said county of Clarion; thence east along said line,
to the Forrest county line."

Section 2 of the supplement to the act of the 31st of
October, 1866, passed the 31st of October, 1866, P. L. Sess.
1867, 1529 authorizes the commissioners who run the line
"to commence at such point, on the line between the
counties of Warren and Venango, so as not to interfere
in any way, with the original line of tracts of land within
said limits."
The act of 3rd of April, 1872, P. L. 861, provides that
the line run by E. P. Goff shall be the boundary line between Forrest and Elk counties.
Lawrence county was formed from parts of Beaver
and Mercer counties by the act of 20th of March, 1849,
P. L. 551, the county to be established as of September 1st,
1849. The boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning at a post on the line between Butler and
Mercer counties at the corner of Wolfcreek and Slipperyrock townships, in Mercer county; thence northwest with
the line dividing said township, to the southeast corner of
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Springfield township; thence westwardly between the townships of Springfield and Slipperyrock, to the southwest
corner of Springfield; thence northwardly along the line
dividing Springfield and Lackawannock townships, threefourths of a mile; thence westwardly parallel with the
south line of Mercer county, to the Ohio state line; thence
south with said line about eighteen and three-fourths miles;
then eastwardly parallel with the north line of Beaver
county, to the line between Beaver and Butler counties;
thence north along the line of Butler county to the place
of beginning."
Fulton county

was formed from a part of Bedford

county by the act of 19th of April, 1850, Sess. 1851, P. L.
805, the act to take effect 1st of September, 1850. The
boundaries were as follows:
"Beginning on the line between the States of Pennsylvania and Maryland at a point where the western boundary
line of Bethel township, in Bedford county, intersects said
State line, thence north along said township line to the
southeastern corner of East Providence township, thence
along the southern line of said township to the top of Ray's
hill, thence along the top of said Ray's hill to the line
between the townships of East Providence and Wells, in
said county, thence along said line to the point where it is
intersected by the line between the townships of Wells
and Broad Top, and thence along said line to the Huntingdon county line, including the townships of Air, Belfast,
Bethel, Dublin, Licking creek, Taylor, Thompson, Tod,
Wells, and part of East Providence."
The formation and boundaries of Fulton county were
confirmed by the Act of 24th March 1851, P. L. 216.
The act of the 6th of March, 1854, P. L. 155, provides
that the house in which Frederick Dubbs resides

to be

deemed entirely within the county of Fulton.
Montour county was formed from a part of Columbia
county by the act of 3rd of May, 1850, P. L.

658.

The

boundaries were as follows:
"All that part of Columbia county included within the
limits of the townships of Franklin, Mahoning, Valley,
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Liberty, Limestone, Derry, Anthony, and the borough of
Danville, together with all that portion of the townships
of Montour, Hemlock and Madison, lying westward of the
following line: Beginning at Leiby's saw mill, on the bank
of the river Susquehanna; thence by the road leading to
the Danville and Bloomsburg road, at or near Samuel
Lazarus's house; the end of the land leading from said road
to Obed Everett's house; thence by said lane to Obed
Everett's house; thence northward to the school house near
David Smith's in Hemlock township; thence by the road
leading from said school house to the state road at Robin's
mill, to the end of the land leading from said road to
John Kinney's house; thence by a straight line to John
Townsend's, near the German meeting house; thence to
Henry Johnston's near Millville; thence by a straight line
to a post in the Lycoming county line, near the road leading
to crawford's saw mill, together wth that part of Roaring
Creek township, lying south and west of a line beginning
at the southeastern corner of Franklin township; thence
eastward by the southern boundary line of Catawissa township to a point directly north of John Yeager's house; thence
southward by a direct line, including John Yeager's house,
to the Schuylkill county line, at the northeast corner of
Barry township:
PROVIDED HOWEVER, That at no time hereafter
shall any portion of the territory now embraced within
the limits of the county of Northumberland be annexed or
attached to the said county of Montour, without the unanimous consent of the qualified voters of said county of
Northumberland, be and the same is hereby erected into
a separate county, to be called Montour, and the seat of
justice for the same is fixed in the borough of Danville."
See Columbia county for line between Columbia and
Montour counties.
Snyder county was formed from part of Union county
by the act of 2nd of March, 1855, P. L. 537. The boundaries
were as follows:
"All that territory now in Union county lying south of
the line commencing at the Northumberland bridge; thence
by the New Berlin mail route to Penns creek, at a point
about one-fourth of a mile above Mower's mill, where said
creek turns suddenly towards the south; thence across

IO
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Penns creek along the southern bank to its nearest contact
with the summit of Jack's mountain, and thence along the
summit of Jack's mountain to the western line of Union
county."
Cameron county was formed from parts of Clinton,

Elk, McKean and Potter counties by the act of 29th of
March, 1860, P. L. 697, to take effect on the second Tuesday of October, 1860.

The boundaries were as follows:

"Beginning at the southeast corner of warrant number
four thousand one hundred and fifty-six, in Grove township,
Clinton county; thence north on warrant lines to the north
line of Clinton county; thence west along the said north
line of Clinton county to the west bank of the Sinnemahoning creek, on warrant number four thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight; thence in a northwesterly direction
to the northeast corner of Shippen township, in M'Kean
county; thence southerly along the western boundary of
said Shippen township to the north west corner of Benezet
township, Elk county; thence east along the northern boundary of Benezet township to the northeast corner of the
same; thence southerly along the dividing line between
Benezet and Gibson townships to the county line of Clearfield; thence easterly along said county line to the southeast corner of Gibson township; thence in a northeasterly
direction to the place of beginning; containing about four
hundred and eighty square miles."

On the first day of January, 1874 a new constitution
went into effect. Article III, Sec. 7 provides that:
"The General Assembly shall not pass any local or
special law authorizing the erection, extension or impairing
of liens; * * * * erecting new counties or changing county
lines."

Heretofore, all of the counties, except Philadelphia,
Chester and Bucks, were formed by special acts of the
legislature. Now the only way to erect a new county
would be under a general act of the assembly subject to
the restraints in Article XIII, Section 1, which is as follows:
"No new county shall be established which shall reduce
any county to less than four hundred square miles, or to
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less than twenty thousand inhabitants; nor shall any county
be formed of less area or containing a less population; nor
shall any line thereof pass within ten miles of the county
seat of any county proposed to be divided."

On the 17th of April, 1878, P. L. 17, a general act was
passed providing for the creation of new counties. On
13th of August, 1878, Lackawanna county was organized
from a part of Luzerne county by a decree of court under
this act. The boundaries of the county are as follows:
"Beginning at a point in Ransom Township on the

Susquehanna River about five (5) feet above low water
mark one (1) mile two hundred forty-seven and one-half
(247.5) feet above the mouth of "Falling Spring Brook."
Thence South 540 18' East eight thousand one hundred
forty-seven (8147.00) feet. to a corner witnessed by a chestnut and two yellow pine trees (each marked by four

notches).
Thence with a deflection of eleven (110)

degrees and

eighteen (18') minutes to the Right a bearing of South
430 00' East one (1) mile four thousand and fifty-six (4056)
feet, to the centre of Gardner's or Mill creek the line between Old Forge and Lackawanna Townships.
Thence up Gardner's or Mill Creek along the line between Old Forge and Lackawanna townships South 190 23'
East about two hundred two and one-half (202.5) feet to
the corner of Old Forge, Lackawanna, and Pittston townships.
Thence along the Northeasterly line of Pittston township South 770 00' East 840 ps.; thence west along the tract
of land in the warrantee name of Jacob Yoner 120 ps. to
the Northwest corner of said Jacob Yoner tract, thence
along the west line of the same 300 ps. to post and stones
in line of Robert Gray tract; thence along the north line
of the same East 60 ps. to a corner, thence South 260 ps.
along the west line of the Joseph Lawrence tract to the line
of William Moore; thence al6ng the North line of the same
East 165 ps. to the northwest corner of the Thomas Dundas
tract; thence south about 525 ps. along the west line of the
same and John C. Christ, thence south 590 00' East about
510 ps. to a corner-it being the northeast corner of the
John Spoon tract and the northwest corner of the township of Buck; thence south along the East line of Bear
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Creek township 1200 ps. to a corner in the north line of
the James Monell tract.
Thence prolonging the last mentioned line S 40 00' W
(magnetic bearing) 4930 ft. to the centre of Choke Creek,
980 feet below the face of the dam at Porter's Pool thence
down Choke Creek the following courses and distances:
(The courses and distances are given in the survey but
are omitted in this article. These courses and distances
can be obtained by reference to the decree of Court filed
in Luzerne or Lackawanna counties.) to the center of the
Lehigh River.
Thence up the centre of the Lehigh River by Survey of
1841 the following magnetic courses and distances to the
point where the "old North Line"-the West line of Wayne
County crosses the Lehigh River; Thence along the "old
North line" the boundary line between Wayne and Luzerne
counties N 20 00' E (magnetic bearing in 1841) twenty-six
(26) miles and thirty-one (31) perches to the corner common to Wayne, Luzerne and Susquehanna Counties; thence
along the line between Luzerne and Susquehanna counties
N 830 15' W (magnetic in 1874) to the corner common to
Luzerne, Susquehanna and Wyoming counties, in the centre
of Tunkhannock creek; thence down this creek along the
boundary line between Luzerne and Wyoming counties the
following courses and distances * * * * to a point where

the county line leaves the creek; thence S 330 15' W 1530
perches to a corner; thence S 300 00' E 160 perches to a
corner; thence S 330 151 W 1130 perches to a corner;
thence S 480 00' E 640 perches to a corner; thence S 360
00' W 2020 perches to the Susquehanna River; thence southeasterly along the East Bank of the Susquehanna River at
low water to a point one (1) mile two hundred and fortyseven (247) ft. above Falling Spring Brook; thence S 540
18' E to the place of beginning. Containing 440 square miles.
Recorded in Dept. Internal Affairs in "Book State Lines,
Roads, etc., page 279." Filed 29 June 1878. Recorded 29
August 1878.
The Act of 17 April i878, P. L. 17 was supplemented
by the Act of 22 April 1879, P. L. 26. The Act of 1878 was
repealed by the Act of June 27, 1895, P. L. 398. At the
present time no new counties can be formed as there is no
act authorizing their erection.
A. J. WHITE HUTTON
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SPEAR v. RITZ RESTAURANT
Sales--Restau-ants-Food.-Impled

Warranty of Fitness

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Spear entered a restaurant on the night of Jan. 1, ordered a
quantity of food and after eating it became violently ill. He was

confined to his bed for a month. Spear brings this action against
the defendant alleging breach of warranty under the Sales Act.
Fishman, for Plaintiff.
Crabtree, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
C. Blitz, J. "The liability of a restaurant keeper for damages
caused by bad food eaten in a restaurant has given rise to some
difference of opinion. The question is sometimes supposed to depend
on whether the restaurant keeper makes a sale to the customer of
the injurious food. It is indeed true that if the transaction amounts
to a sale-numerous authorities-establish liability". Vol. 1, Page
445, 2nd Ed. Williston on Sales.
Obviously then there are two questions in this case. First, is
the receiving, eating, and paying for food delivered by a restaurant
keeper to a customer a sale of food or merely a sale of service in
which the title to the food served by the restaurant keeper never
passes? Second, if it is a sale of food, is it such a sale as to carry
with it an implied warranty under the Sales Act that the food is
reasonably fit for consumption?
The few Pennsylvania authorities relevant to the first question,
and the weight of authority in other jurisdictions hold unequivacally
that the transaction is a sale. Com. v. Miller, 131 Pa. 118; Com.
v. Hendley.
In Commonwealth v. Miller, supra, the defendant, keeper of a
restaurant, served oleomargarine with a meal to a guest, who was
charged and paid fifty cents for the meal. The action was brought
under
Par. 3, Act of May 21, 1885, (P. L. 22), which provided that,
4
every person-who shall manufacture, sell, or offer, or expose for
sale, or have in his-possession with intent to sell, "oleomargarine,"
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shall, for every offense, forfeit and pay the sum of $100." The only
question in that case is whether or not the furnishing of the oleomargarine to the customer was a sale. In answer to this question
the learned Mr. Justice Clark states, "That the food furnished to
McRay and Spence (the customers) or so much of it as they saw fit
to appropriate, was sold to them, cannot be reasonably questioned;
when it was set before them it was theirs to all intents and purposes
to eat all or a part, as they chose, subject only to the restaurants'
right to receive the price, which it is admitted was promptly paid.
They might not eat all of the articles set before them, but they had
an undoubted right to do so, and even assuming that the meal is
the portion of food taken, in the sense stated, the transaction must
be regarded as a sale wholly within the purpose and meaning of the
statute."
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has made a correct observation when he directs the court's attention to the fact that Mr. Justice
Clark does not say that the restaurant keeper does no sell food
generally or sells food for the purpose of the statute, but makes
the broad and general statement, that food (that means all food)
furnished to a customer by a restarant keeper is a sale.
Commonwealth v. Hendley, supra, is an analagous case to Cornv. Miller, supra. There oleomargarine was furnished for gain as a
part of a meal to the guests of a caterer. The question was one of
liability for penalty under the Act of 1885. The defense was that
while he sold his bread, meat, coffee, and other articles of food to
his patrons, he generously gave away his oleomargarine. Quoting
from the opinion of Wickman, J. in relation to the defence: "This
defence was duly presented to the alderman and he doubtless being
satisfied, from a consideration of the evidence offered on both sides,
that it was the same old and threadbare subterfuge so often unavailingly resorted to by unlicensed liquor dealers, and that the transaction was in reality a sale, altho pretendedly a gift, found against
the defendant." In that case the judgment of the lower court refusing appeal from the magistrate's decision was upheld and it was
held that a public caterer who for gain furnishes oleomargarine as
part of a meal to his guest is subject to the penalty provided by
Act of Assembly.
The above mentioned cases are authority for holding that a
restaurant keeper seels his food and does not merely sell service.
If he sells the oleomargarine, can it be said with impunity that he does
not sell the bread that goes with it?
Friend v. Child's Dining Hall Co. 231 Mass. 65 presents a situation exactly analagous to the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff
entered a restaurant and ordered beans and corned beef. The plain-
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tiff started to eat the food, bit down on some of the beans and was
hurt, when the plaintiff took the things from her mouth, she found
them to be stones. The reasoning of Rugg, C. J. in Friend v. Child's
Dining Hall Co., supra, is similar to the reasoning of the court
in the case at bar. In that case Rugg, C. J. considered the case of
Com. v. Worcester, 126 Mass. 256, in which case people went to the
defendant's dwelling house and were there served with meals; with
these and as a part thereof intoxicating liquors were provided. The
price paid was single including both food and drink. The complaint
was for keeping a tenement used for the illegal sale and illegal
keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors. It was held that: "'The
purchase of a meal includes all the articles that go to make.up the
meal. It was wholly immaterial that no specific price is allotted to
those articles separately. If the meal included intoxicating liquors
the purchase of the meal would be a purchase of the liquors. It
would be immaterial that other articles were included in the purchase
and all were charged in one collective price." Rugg, C. J. then goes
on to cite in support of this principle numerous other cases. He
continues: "In view of these decisions it would be difficult for this
court to hold that the transaction arising from a contract to serve a
guest food to be eaten by him on the premises of a keeper of an
eating house is not a sale. If it is a sale, theh plainly it is governed
bythe Uniform Sales Act."
Subsection 1, Sec. 15 of Sales Act, May 19, 1915 (P. L. 543)
(Uniform Sales Act holds, "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller, the particular purpose for which
the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the
seller's skill, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose."
The second question presented is whether the sale of the food
was such a sale as to carry with it an implied warranty under the
Sales Act.
It might easily be inferred, from the relations of the parties, that
the guest who asks to be served food upon the premises of one who is
the keeper of a restaurant makes known, as the particular purpose
for which the food is required, that it is then and there to be eaten
and that he relies on the latter's skill or judgment in the selection and
preparation of the food. Hence there would be an implied warranty
that it was reasonably fit for such purpose.
Dietrick v. Coal Co. 17 Sch. 27 holds that there is an implied
warranty that goods be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they
are intended.
There is an implied warranty of pureness of food furnished by a
restaurant keeper, and subjects him to liability for special damages
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that may result from impure food. Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410,
N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1918 F, 1172.
Being of the opinion that the transaction between Spear and
Ritz Restaurant was a sale and being a sale, it is accompanied
the implied warranty specified in the Sales Act, we find for
plaintiff
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The only cases applicable have held that the offering and eating
of food in a restaurant constitutes a sale of the food. These cases
so decided were, however, cases arising under penal statutes for the
protection of public health. But with other jurisdictions diametrically
opposed and with substituted bases for both holdings, we prefer to
follow the pointing of these earlier cases. There was a sale of food.
The situation of the parties implies a warranty of fitness for eating,
the warranty was broken, and recovery is permitted.
The judgment is affirmed.

HIMES v. ROCKS
Negligence-Automobiles--Collision-Measure
of Damages-Hire of
Substitute-Interest on Sum from Time of Trespass
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff sued in trespass for the negligent injury to his automobile. The jury, in assessing damages, allowed the plaintiff for loss
of use of his car as measured by the cost of hiring a substitute.
They also allowed interest on the sum found as the amount of injury
from the time it occurred as an element of damages. The defendant
has appealed claiming that these elements of damage are not allowable.
Yosko, for plaintiff.
Woodside, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Tripician, J. There are two questions of law in this case that
must be decided. The first is whether the loss of use of an automobile as measured by the cost of hiring a substitute is a proper
element of damages in a recovery for the negligent injury to the
automobile; the second whether interest on the sum found as the
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amount of injury from the time it occurred is allowable.
It is practically admitted by the defendant and it is undoubtedly
a well recognized rule of law that where, thru an injury to personal
property, the plaintiff is temporarily deprived of its use, the measure
of damages is the amount of the injury to the property together
with the value of its use during the time required by the exercise of
proper diligence to secure its repair.
The defendant contends however that, to entitle the plaintiff to
recover for the loss of use of his automobile, there must be shown
an actual pecuniary loss. It seems to us that the facts here indicate
that such loss was shown, namely the expense of hiring a substitute.
However, lest this be not the fact, a perusal of the defendant's
arguments and an application of the existing law on the point, defeat
him nevertheless. He says that, if a plaintiff is allowed to recover
for the loss of the use of his "pleasure" car without pecuniary damage being shown, he will be awarded damages for the mere interference with his pleasure, or, in other words, for little more than
mere mental anquish-not a proper element of damages.
We are not certain that this car was a "pleasure" car, but againgranting the point-the defendant loses sight of the fact that for the
mere violation of a right, damages are usually forthcoming, at least
in this type of case. A right to enjoyment or to use of property is
an incident of property.
Hence, we find in Cook v. Packard Motor Car Company, 88 Conn.
590, that an automobile owner who expects to use his car for pleasure
only has the same right to its continued use and possession as an
owner who rents his car for profit; and the legal basis for recovery
in the case of a deprivation of the use of the car is the same in the
one case as in that of the other.
The only difficulty in applying the rule of no compensatory
damages to cases of this character is the practical difficulty of estimating the amount of actual damage. But the law will not deny
substantial damages to one who has suffered a substantial injury
merely on the ground that the injury has not or will not produce a
pecuniary loss, or that it is difficult to estimate the amount of
damages.
In Bauer v. Armour Co., 84 Superior 174, a case practically identical to the case at bar, and decided in 1924, the plaintiff was allowed
damages for loss of the use of his car. In that case, however, the
plaintiff had hired a substitute. But the mere fact of hiring a substitute should not influence the court in giving damages for loss of
use. This fact merely remains enforcible. The jury in this case
correctly assessed the damagees in this particular.
The second question of law involved, as to the allowing of
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interest on the sum found as the amount of damages, presents another interesting point of law, and is likewise admirably argued by
the learned counsel for the defense who cites many leading cases
laying down the principles of law with which we concur. The allowing of interest, in tort cases, on the sum found as the measure of
damages from the time the injury occured is, by the great weight
of Pennsylvania authority, improper.
As the counsel for the defense points out, recovery for the loss
of use takes the place of interest. Edwards v. Beele, 48 Barb. (N. Y.).
Other practical objections to the allowance of interest are laid down
in Weir v. The County of Allegheny, 95 Pa. 413, which the defendant
has cited.
The jury erred in allowing interest and the court below in not
allowing a new trial for that reason. Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
A cardinal principle of the law of damages is that the injured
party has the right to be made whole for the financial loss suffered.
One element of damage was the injury to his machine. But surely
as important an element is the loss of use which is one of the
rights of ownership. How can the owner be made whole unless
he is allowed this loss? No sufficient reason has been advanced.
We must presume that the evidence justified the allowance of loss
of use, if it is a proper element.
This loss is made certain
and definite by the cost of hiring a substitute. It is properly allowed,
Bauer v. Armour Co., 84 Super. 174.
Interest, if regarded as a penalty, can not be allowed. Interest,
as such, is not allowable in the case of injury to personal property.
But it is a proper element of damage if the delay in making a proper
settlement has been due solely to the action of the defendant and
the jury may allow compensation for that delay. This element is
not the same as loss of use. We must presume, in the absence of
contrary knowledge, that the jury were properly instructed as to the
allowance of interest.
Both points ruled here may be found in Johnson v. Ferry Co.,
17 Del. Co. Reports 29, decided by the U. S. Dist. C., E. D. of Pa.
interpretating Pennsylvania law, and also Conover v. Bloom, 269
Pa. 548.
The judgment of the learned court below on the second item of
damage is reversed and judgment is here entered for the plaintiff.
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X. v. Y. at m.
Equity -

Mortgage - Foreclosure Fraud Reconveyance
Married Woman Inchoate Dower
STATEMENT OF FACTS

When X and Y married, X owned a certain piece of realty.
After the marriage, with intent of depriving her (Y) of any interest therein, X induced her to join in a mortgage of this realty
for $5,000, which money he received. When due he failed to pay
it altho amply able to do so. He then induced Z, holder of the
mortgage, to foreclose it. He did so making Y a party defendant.
Z was the purchaser at the sale for $6,000, furnished by X. Z
then conveyed the realty, at X's request, to M, a brother of X,
without consideration. Y then learned of these various steps and
brings this bill in equity against all concerned asking that X be
declared the owner of the property and that it be conveyed to him.
Davis, for plaintiff.
Holl, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Carpenter, J. There is a conflict of opinion as to the protection the law affords to the inchoate right of dower of the
wife, or the statutory provision in lieu thereof, yet as regards
conveyances in fraud of the marital rights of the wife, the decisions uniformly hold that she is entitled to protection even tho
her interest has not ripened into a vested property right by the
death of her husband. In Killinger v. Reidenhauer, 6 S. & R. 531,
the court held that a fraudulent mortgage given to defeat the
wife's right of dower is void as to that right. In McClurg v.
Schwartz, 87 Pa. 521, it was held that where a husband gives a
mortgage upon his property and suffers judgment on the same,
with intent to defraud his wife of her dower, and the mortgagee
has constructive notice of her rights, she has a strong equity to
be allowed to intervene, and to have a rule to show cause why
the judgment should not be opened and she be let into a defense
to the extent of her dower. In Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206
Pa. 433, a husband confessed judgment for the purpose of depriving his wife of her martial rights. The court held that the
wife was entitled to have the judgment opened. In these cases,
the wife was recognized as having a right which the law will
protect even before the death of her husband.
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In this case the mortgage given by X, which was clearly for
the purpose of defrauding Y of her dower rights in the property,
was void as to her interest. Killinger v. Reidenauer, 6 S. & R. 531.
The defendant claims that it cannot be set aside by Y because she
has not used due diligence. This argument is adequately answered
by the court in Moore v. Durnan, 70 N. J. Eq. 61: "In my judgment
a party who has perpetrated a fraud upon another thru the forms of
the law, or otherwise, cannot be permitted to set up as a defense to
his fraud that the defrauded party ought to have discovered the
fraud, and protected himself or herself against it at the time. It
does not alter the character or effect of the fraud that it was successful and that the defrauded party might have protected himself
or herself against it and failed, either thru oversight, positive neglect,
or otherwise, to do so, and in my judgment no estoppel arises out of
his failure." But even tho the mortgage is void as to the rights of
the wife nevertheless it will not be set aside because the court in
Killinger v. Reidenhauer, supra, expressly stated that the mortgage
is valid as against all the world except the wife's dower rights. Then
at the mortgage sale, Z, the purchaser, since he cooperated with the
husband and was thus a party of the fraud, took with notice of the
wife's rights and therefore he held the legal title subject to her
dower rights. Gerrand v. Pittsburgh & Connelsville Ry. Co., 29 Pa.
154. And since M, to whom the property was finally conveyed, was
not a purchaser for value, he also took subject to her rights. So Y
still has her inchoate right of dower in the property even tho the
legal title is in M.
The same result can be reached in another way even if Z at the
mortgage sale purchased without notice of Y's rights and therefore
free from them. McClurg v. Schwartz, 87 Pa. 521. Z purchased the
property in question with money furnished by X so there was a
resulting trust in favor of X. Harrold v. Lane, 53 Pa. 268. Then
when the land was conveyed to M, who paid no consideration, he took
subject to the trust in favor of X, because he could not claim to be a
purchaser for value. Gerrard v. Pittsburgh & Connelsville Ry. Co.,
29 Pa. 154. Since M holds the property in trust for X, X has the
equitable title. And since the general rule is that a wife has dower
rights in the equitable estate of her husband (Shoemaker v. Walker,
2 S. & R. 554; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. 149) so Y still has her dower
interests in the property.
But in either case Y is not adequately protected because if M
should convey to a bona fide purchaser for value her dower right
would be destroyed. McClurg v. Schwartz, 87 Pa. 521. So this
action is brought to protect her rights and guard against such destruction of them. The remedy she asks is that M be compelled to
convey the legal title to X to whom it belongs. This relief cannot be
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granted. The general rule is that the beneficiary alone, or some one
who has a legal or equitable interest in the property, is the only one
who can enforce a trust and ask for conveyance of the legal title
from a trustee. And a contingent interest, such as a wife's inchoate
right of dower, is not such an interest as will enable her to enforce
the trust. Allen v. White, 85 Pac. 695 (a Colorado case); McChord
v. Caldwell, 96 Ky. 617. But such a conveyance is not necessary for
the protection of her rights. In Duncan v. Duncan, 265 Pa. 471, a
husband conveyed personal property secretely to his sister, in trust
for himself, in fraud of his wife's martial rights. The court decreed
that the sister be declared a trustee and enjoined her from disposing
of the property. In Brown v. Brown, 82 N. J. Eq. 40, and in Pinkinson v. Pinkinson, 117 Atl. 48, another New Jersey case, the husband
furnished money for the purchase of property while the legal title
was taken by another. This was done for the purpose of defeating
the wife of her dower rights. In the former case the court said:
"It seems to me that a wife's inchoate right of dower in lands held
by another may be secured by a bill in equity. Unless the wife acts
diligently, the holder of the legal title may convey the estate to an
innocent purchaser and thus stop her from claiming her dower when
it should become consumate." In both cases relief was given. The
decrees were not for the conveyance of the legal title but provided
for the protection of her rights while the property remained in the
hands of the trustee.
In this case, I am of opinion that the wife should be protected.
I cannot grant, nor is it necessary, that the legal title be conveyed
to the husband. She will be sufficiently protected if M be restrained
from conveying to a bona fide purchaser for value. So the decree
is that M be enjoined from conveying the land in question without
the consent of the court.
OPINION'OF THE SUPREME COURT
Inchoate dower, or inchoate "statutory dower," as well as the
perfected right, will be protected by the courts from fraudulent
destruction. That the measures here taken were entirely fraudulent
is undeniable. Nor will the fact that the parties attempting the
fraud clothed the step with apparent legality by means of a foreclosure sale deter the court from giving relief under the circumstances here disclosed. See Byrnes v. Owen, (N. Y. 1926), 153
N. E. 51.
What then shall be the relief accorded the plaintiff? No sufficient reason is shown for denying the specific relief prayed for.
Equity generally will declare void, fraudulent transfers. Here a
further step is taken-a reconveyance to the husband-in order to
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vitiate the results of the foreclosure sale. The plaintiff is not attempting to enforce a trust. She relies entirely on fraud-not on a
purchase money resulting trust. No rights of bona fide purchasers
for value intervene to prevent such reconveyance. It is doubtful if
the Act of 1917, P. L. 429, 434 would be applicable for it gives her
the same share in lands aliened by her husband only in case she has
not joined in the conveyance. Here she has joined in the mortgage
resulting in the conveyance. No sufficient reason being given for
denying the relief asked, and since such relief may obviate the necessity of further legal action, the decree of the learned court below

is modified to conform to the above opinion and as modified, is
affirmed.

MOXIE v. SEVERN
Practice--C. P.-Verdict-Jury
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In an action of assumpsit between the above parties, the jury
brought in a verdict, "We find for the defendant, "Not guilty". The
court decided that the verdict was informal and defective and then
sent the jury back to correct it. The jury was then unable to agree
on a verdict and the court discharged them. The defendant moved
the court to enter judgment on the informal verdict. The court refused and the defendant appealed.
J. Greenburg, for plaintiff.
Friedman, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
S. Horwitz, J. In the case at bar it is clearly shown that the
verdict of the jury, which was, "We find for the defendant, Not
guilty", was not accepted by the court for the court's record. Instead the jury was requested to return to the jury-room and present
a new verdict in proper form. The jury having retired failed to
agree on a verdict, they were not bound by the former verdict and
the case was still entirely in their hands. The verdict cannot be held
to have any validity at all. The appeal is based on the court's refusal to accept the informal verdict rendered by the jury.
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It is very clearly stated in Commonwealth v. Nicely, 230 Pa.
261, that, "Until a jury is discharged, the verdict may be amended.
After they are discharged and dispersed however, it is too late. If
there is any informality, uncertainty or impropriety regarding a
verdict, the court may require the jury to amend it before- they separate. The verdict is what is amended in open court and recorded
as such, not what was written and handed to the trial judge, and
until so amended and recorded the jury may correct any mistake
inadvertently made therein, and the court may request them to
retire for that purpose." This point is also set forth in Wolfran v.
Eyster, 7 WATTS 38, Commonwealth v. Huston, 46 Sup. 172.
It is necessary for the court to look after the form and substance
of a verdict rendered by the jury so that he may prevent any doubtful
or insufficient finding from passing into the court's records, which
would probably make a new trial necessary later.
In Commonwealth v. Huston, supra, the court said, "When a
jury tenders a verdict which is uncertain or informal it is proper for
the court to reject it, as not warranted by the law, call the attention
of the jury to the defect, and send them back to their room where
they can without interference or influence of others find such a
verdict as they think proper." There are many authorities supporting this same principal among which are Beats v. Retallick, 23 Pa.
288, Commonwealth v. Nicely, supra., Walker v. State, 13 Tex. Ct.
App. 618, Commonwealth v. Thompson, 116 Mass. 343, Porterfield v.
Commonwealth, 91 Va. 801, Peahltman v. State, 87 Ga. 549, Grant v.
State, 33 Fla. 291, State v. Clipton, 30 La. An. 951.
In the case at bar, the jury had rendered an informal verdict, and
it is proper for the court to reject the verdict and send them back
for further deliberation, since the jury had not been discharged nor
separated. Yet the judge must not even suggest the alteration of a
verdict in substance. The action of the judge in the correction of
verdicts should be exercised with great caution. The old practice
allowed a greater exercise of authority by the judge over verdicts
than is now permitted. McConnal v. Linton 4 Watts 357.
In the instant case there is nothing to indicate that the judge
even suggested what kind of a verdict should be rendered by the jury.
There is in the State of Washington the case of Bino v. Veenhuzen, 250 Pac. 450, Washington Supreme Court, which has determined'a case precisely like the one at bar. The court said, "The
purpose of law is apparent. All too often questions arise upon the
true construction of verdicts, even those that are only informal and
defective, and appeals result. It is to the interest of clients, counsel
and the courts to have verdicts returned in such form as to obviate
perplexing questions arising therefrom. The trial court out of an
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abundance of caution desired to have the verdict in proper form.
His action therefore should be commended rather than frowned
upon."
When a jury which brings in an informal verdict is sent out to
bring in a. new verdict and then fails to agree upon another, it may
be said that they never had agreed to the defective verdict which
was brought in.
A judge, both in civil and criminal courts, has a perfect right and
sometimes it is his bounden duty to tell the jury to re-consider their
verdict. Rex. v. Meanny, 9 C. C. 231, Lehigh & C. C. 8 Jur. U. S.
1161, 11 Weeks reports 4. He may send them back any number of
times to reconsider their findings. Ibid. The judge is not bound
to record the first verdict unless the jury insist upon its being recorded. Ibid. If they find another verdict, that is the true verdict.
Ibid.
We fail to see where the trial court committed an error in
refusing to record the defective verdict.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The issue here presented is whether the appellate court will reverse the action of the trial court in sending back the jury to
correct an informal verdict. It is not in issue whether the appellate
court would have sustained the trial court had he entered judgment
for the defendant on the informal verdict.
The action of the learned court below was within its discretionary
power and the judgment of the immediate court below is affirmed on
its authorities.
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In December, 1903, Munsey bought certain real estate. In December, 1905, he deeded it through an intermediary, without consideration, to his wife. In April, 1909, she died intestate, leaving her husband and a daughter of theirs to survive her. On June 24, 1915, the
daughter died unmarried and intestate, leaving her father surviving
but no brothers or sisters or descendants of herself or them. The
father died in 1924 having devised the property in question to the
defendant. The collateral heirs of the daughter, ex parte materna,
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bring this action of ejectment against the defendant, claiming the
fee to the property.
Bass, for plaintiff.
Nary, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Engelbach, J. "Upon the death of the wife, the husband acquired a life estate with remainder in fee to the daughter." Reed v.
Geddes, 135 Ati. 232;-Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 316, sections 1
and 2. Upon the death of the daughter intesate, the question arises,
whether the remainder vested in the father or in the collateral heirs,
ex parte materna.
In order to determine this question another inquiry must be
answered. Is the father or mother the propositus, or the first purchaser, from whom the interitable blood must descend? If the
mother is the propositus, then the plaintiff should recover in this
action of ejeectment; if the father is the propositus, then the defendant should prevail. "It is the opinion of this court that upon the
death the remainder vested in the father." Reed v. Geddes, 135 Atl.
232.
Section 9 of the Act of 1833, April 8th provides:
"That no person who is not of the blood of the ancestors or
other relations from whom any real estate descended, or by whom it
was given or devised to the intestate, shall in any of the cases
before mentioned, take any estate of interitance therein, but such
real estate subject to such life estates as may be in existence by
virtue of this act, shall pass to and vest in such other persons as
would be entitled by this act, if the persons not of the blood of
such ancestor or other relation had never existed, or were dead at
the decease of the intestate."
This act makes no distinction between estates descended, estates
given or estates devised. They are all put in the same category, and
in each case we must determine from whom the land descended or
by whtm it was given or devised to the intestate. Lewis v. Gorman,
5 Pa. 163; Moffit v. Clark, 6 Watts & Sergeant 258.
The 9th section of the Act of 1833, considered with reference to
Lewis v. Gorman, Reed v. Geddes, Moffit v. Clark, supra and Hartman's Estate, 4 Rawle 39, will aiiswer the contention of the plaintiff,
which is, that a devise and fee of real property by a husband to a
wife passes it out of the line of his descent of the land. Under the
Act of 1833, section 9, one who takes by gift, devise or descent
from an ancestor or other relation is not to be viewed as starting
a new line of descent. To make him so, it is necessary that he
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become a purchaser for value in the popular sense, or a donee or
devisee from one who is a stranger to his blood. In support of
this proposition we cite Lewis v. Gorman, supra.
In the recent case of Reed v. Geddes, supra, it was determined
that a gift of land by husband to wife'does not start a new line
of descent; the husband is the person from whom the inheritable
blood is to be derived.
The authority stated in Reed v. Geddes, supra, and upon which
the learned Court bases its decision does not, in our opinion, offer
any justification whatsoever for the conclusion which was reached.
We have made a careful survey of the cases stated and will briefly
discuss each.
In Lewis v. Gorman, supra, the facts are: the last owner of the
property in controversy died intestate without issue, seized of land
which descended from his mother, who was the devisee of her father,
who was himself devisee of his father, who purchased from a
stranger. There as in this present suit, the plaintiff claimed under
the mother. In that case it was necessary, in order to discover the
propostius, to ascend to the first purchaser. It was the grandfather
of the intestate's mother. The father devised the land to his daughter who was the mother of the intestate. It was held that 'a father
is the ancestor of his daughter or son and a devise from a father to
a child does not start a new line of descent.
Moffit v. Clark, supra, holds that a devise from a father to son
is not to be considered as a purchase and therefore the father is the
ancestor and propositus.
Hartman's Estate, supra, settles that in case of a gift or devise
by a father to a child the devisee is not esteemed in our statutes as
a purchaser, but we must go back to him who actually acquired the
estate and brought it into the family, in deciding who is entitled to
succeed to the inheritance.
We have examined the cases cited by the counsels for both the
plaintiff and defendant, and in every case there is a devise from
father to child, and we have not found any sentence which expressly or impliedly says that a gift or devise from husband to wife
is the same as a gift or devise from father to child. They are silent
on this point.
The plaintiff cites Culbertson v. Duly, 7 Watts & Sergeant 195,
and Walker v. Dunchee, 38 Pa. 430. The decision in each of these
cases is in direct antagonism with the one drawn by the court in
Reed v. Geddes, supra, and these cases were not cited in Reed v.
Geddes; but in light of the fact that Reed v. Geddes is a very
recent case, this court feels that it is bound by the principles of
law therein stated, and renders its decision in favor of the defendant.
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The learned court below has correctly ruled that the case is
governed by the recent case of Reed v. Geddes, 135 AtL 232. But
we cannot concur in the view that prior cases offer no justification
for the doctrine of Reed v. Geddes, supra.
True, Culbertson v. Duly, 7 W. & S. 195 and Walkeer v. Dunchee,
38 Pa. 430, would seem to decide that the wife in such a case as this
starts a new line of descent. But these cases must be taken to have
been over-ruled by later decisions such as Lynch's Estate, 220 Pa.
14, and the many cases citing Lewis v. Gorman, 5 Pa. 164, with
approval. As the cases show, one taking by gift does not start a new
line of descent. Even tho the most frequent examples be those of
devises to children, no reason, sufficient or otherwise, is suggested
for distinguishing the case of a gift to a wife. The principle clearly
is the same. The principle, often reiterated, is that one taking by
gift or by devise, does not take as a purchaser. The plaintiffs, not
being of the blood of the first purchaser, must fail, Hess v. Riegel,
4 D. & C. 233.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed for the
reasons above stated.

